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Despite a faltering start,[url=http://www.moncler-sale.org]moncler down jackets[/url], the opening of a Taliban office in Doha raised hopes of installing a full-fledged Afghan peace process. Although last week’s move ran into early difficulties, it nonetheless marked a significant milestone in diplomatic efforts aimed at a negotiated settlement of the twelve-year-old war. If proof was needed of the complications of peacemaking, it came within hours of what was meant to be a carefully choreographed inauguration of the Taliban’s political office. No sooner had President Obama described this as an “important first step” towards reconciliation at a G-8 summit than Afghan President Hamid Karzai announced a boycott of the Qatar process. Karzai also suspended talks on a security deal aimed at a post-2014 US military presence in Afghanistan.Karzai’s fury over a development that was long in the making mimicked his mercurial stance of the past two years – since efforts to establish a negotiating channel in Qatar got underway,[url=http://www.moncler-sale.org]moncler sale[/url], initially through backchannel contacts between American and Taliban representatives. This time, however,[url=http://www.moncler-sale.org]moncler on sale[/url], Karzai’s anger was prompted by the Taliban’s use of the ‘Islamic Emirates’ sign and flag at the office where they made the announcement. Kabul accused Qatar and the US of violating understandings that the office would only be a venue for peace talks and not have the appearance of a rival Afghan embassy.Instead of seeking to quietly resolve the issue, the Karzai administration went public in a display of rage and retributive actions. The banner became the source of immediate contention. But Karzai’s fundamental problem was in joining a process that,[url=http://www.moncler-sale.org]discount moncler jackets[/url], if successful, would make him politically irrelevant.Within a day the plaque was removed and the flag lowered. Washington acted quickly through the Qataris and also moved to placate Kabul to prevent the process from unravelling. Though Karzai may have been more damaged by the diplomatic fracas than the peace process several consequences followed and the process stalled. An American statement in support of the office was put on hold,[url=http://www.moncler-sale.org]moncler outlet[/url], to wait until the cooling of tempers and announcements from Kabul. The start of formal US-Taliban talks was delayed.This shaky beginning did not,[url=http://www.moncler-sale.org]moncler outlet[/url], however, obscure the significance of the Doha development or minimise the intense diplomatic effort that went into it, in which Pakistan played a vital behind-the-scenes role. The opening of the Doha office represented the first concrete sign of a willingness to negotiate on the part of the two parties to the Afghan conflict: the US and the Taliban. It was the strongest signal yet of their interest in seeking a political end to the war. It also marked international recognition of the Taliban as a legitimate negotiating partner.In return Taliban representatives read out a statement at the office opening. This contained two key messages that Washington long called for and which were requirements for the office to open. The first was the undertaking that Afghanistan’s soil would not be used to ‘harm’ and threaten other countries; the second was the Taliban’s willingness to “meet (other) Afghans”.Both sides stepped back from their previous positions to reach agreement on the office. The Taliban statement, which resembled past pronouncements,[url=http://www.moncler-sale.org]moncler down jackets[/url], did not quite contain the language US officials may have wanted to affirm the Taliban’s public ‘break with Al-Qaeda’. But it was accepted by Washington as “the first step in distancing them...from international terrorism”.The most significant policy shift in the pre-history of this development actually occurred in 2011 when the US turned its previous three pre-conditions for talks into negotiating outcomes: that the Taliban ‘break with Al-Qaeda’, renounce violence and accept the Afghan constitution. US secretary of state Hillary Clinton announced this in a February 2011 speech, which for the first time also explicitly endorsed direct talks with the Taliban. This followed President Obama’s June 2010 speech that acknowledged there was no military solution in Afghanistan.The Taliban too showed flexibility to secure the political office. In March 2012 the Taliban abandoned preliminary talks with US interlocutors accusing them of going back on promises to release five Taliban prisoners from Guantanamo that they claimed was previously agreed to. The exchange of these detainees for the only American prisoner of war in Taliban custody was supposed to be part of a package of confidence-building measures that was to include a Taliban statement disassociating from Al-Qaeda. The talks broke down over how these steps should be sequenced, with the Taliban insisting on the prisoner swap first. The deadlock contributed to the 18-month hiatus in direct US-Taliban contacts.In issuing their statement at Doha, the Taliban accepted a sequence on which their leaders had earlier demurred. This turnaround was helped in no small measure by Pakistan’s efforts with the Taliban. These efforts intensified following the April 24 meeting in Brussels between US Secretary of State John Kerry and army chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani. The Taliban were persuaded to accept a sequence in which they would first issue the statement rather than insist on the prisoner release as a pre-requisite. The statement would also convey Taliban willingness to enter an intra-Afghan dialogue. This was expected to include members of Kabul’s High Peace Council, once this body was broadened. The Taliban’s ambiguously-worded statement made no reference to the HPC but it was anticipated that such talks would follow sometime after the opening round of US-Taliban negotiations, where the prisoner exchange would top the agenda. It took over two years of intense diplomatic efforts to get to this point. There were several missed opportunities along the way. For example in December 2011, agreement seemed to be at hand for stakeholders to consider announcing the Doha office at the Bonn conference. But Karzai’s fierce opposition torpedoed this. The impossible conditions he set also became stumbling blocks subsequently. For example he insisted on an MoU from Qatar specifying terms for the office as determined by him. Neither the Qataris nor the Americans obliged. President Obama prevailed on Karzai to drop this demand during his January 2013 Washington visit,[url=http://www.moncler-sale.org]moncler sale[/url], only to find him later wriggle out of this. This prompted frenetic White House efforts to walk Karzai back to his commitment.Another reason for the diplomatic impasse of the past two years was the Obama administration’s vacillation on the prisoner exchange out of fear of a congressional backlash. Had the prisoner swap happened earlier the peace process would have been set in motion before and negotiations would have been further ahead. Once the Taliban suspended talks last year their leaders too came under pressure from the rank-and-file to ‘wait it out’ and not make concessions. The Qatar process was revived only after Obama’s re-election, changes in his national security team and Pakistan’s vigorous intercession with Washington in early 2013 to give the Doha track a decisive push. What injected urgency into the effort was the looming deadline of 2014 when Nato combat troops depart Afghanistan.The Doha office is of course just the beginning of a difficult journey fraught with many obstacles. The immediate challenge is to revive the agreement presumed to have been reached earlier between all sides about the rules for the Taliban office and the sequence of meetings to formally launch the peace process. This means bringing Karzai back on board to ensure he doesn’t derail the process. It also requires getting the Taliban to agree to talks with HPC representatives, initially perhaps in their individual capacity. Would US warnings that the Doha office will be shut down if the Taliban do not agree be sufficient ‘incentive’ to get talks started? How and when will the detainees’ exchange proceed? That this has to be tackled while fighting continues in Afghanistan will also expose the fragile process to turbulence.Then there are questions beyond the immediate. What kind of political accommodation is possible among parties with little or no trust between them? How will differences over the Afghan constitution be reconciled? There are more questions than answers,[url=http://www.moncler-sale.org]discount moncler jackets[/url],[url=http://www.moncler-sale.org]moncler on sale[/url], but then everyone accepts that forging peace will be harder than waging war.
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